Nigeria’s rolling mills run partly on imported billet and partly on scrap that arrives through a collection chain nobody has measured, and the dependence runs in one direction only. The collectors at the base of that chain are the country’s recycling system in the same way informal collectors are across the continent, and the mills’ supply security sits on a workforce whose output is unrecorded, whose legal status is undefined, and whose absence would move the mills’ cost base immediately. That is the arrangement, and it is not a transitional one.
The collection trade’s structure is the one that works everywhere, and it works in Nigeria at a scale the continent’s data eventually reveals by omission. Collectors buy or gather metal household by household, in markets, from workshops and from end-of-life equipment, and sell to yard aggregators, who sell to foundries and re-rolling mills or to the exporters who move the material out through the ports. The chain is financed by material value at every step, needs no subsidy, and adjusts its own prices to whatever the mills are paying, which is the market mechanism that a state-funded collection programme would have to be designed to imitate.
The Nigerian numbers are the ones that make the dependence explicit. The Global E-waste Monitor 2024 records Nigeria generating about 500 million kilograms of e-waste in 2022, the largest total in West Africa, and the country’s collection system is being organised on the producer side: the National Environmental (Electrical and Electronics Sector) Regulations date from 2011 and were amended in January 2023 to strengthen extended producer responsibility, and the E-waste Producer Responsibility Organisation Nigeria maintains the producer registry and collects the fees that fund collection, awareness, research and standards. Africa’s documented formal collection across the whole continent was 25 million kilograms in 2022, 0.7 per cent of generation, against a world figure of 22.3 per cent.
The import side adds the second stream the collectors receive alongside the domestic one. The Monitor’s 2019 figures show Africa’s recorded e-waste imports at 546 million kilograms, of which 527 million arrived outside the Basel Convention’s controlled procedures, and its analysis of port findings says the illicit share of inspected shipments in Nigeria was at least one-third by weight. The consequence for the collector network is that it receives material from both a domestic stream and a second-hand import stream that arrive through the same markets, and the mills receive the metal from both without either being recorded separately anywhere.
Why now is the registry’s arrival, because a fee structure that begins to fund collection will eventually be spent on a collection layer, and the question is which layer. The world’s generation has risen five times faster than documented recycling since 2010, and the Monitor projects the global documented rate falling to 20 per cent by 2030, while Nigeria’s own equipment base keeps expanding and its import stream keeps arriving. The country has a rare opportunity to build its funded collection on the trade that exists, since the fees now collect against a registry for the first time and the network they could finance is already working.
The economic consequence of a recording system is that the mills gain what they currently pay a premium to avoid, which is the surprise. A documented domestic scrap stream priced against imported billet is a hedge on its own account, and the country’s foreign exchange position has been the reason its mills have intermittently struggled to secure the imported material they were built around. That structural argument, rather than an environmental one, is why the registry and the collector network are the same project: every kilogram of recorded domestic collection is a kilogram of import dependence that disappears, and the collectors are the only part of the supply chain whose output is available in the quantity the mills need.
What should happen is the licensing of the collector network as the delivery arm the producer fees pay for, with weighbridge documentation at the aggregation yards and a price per delivered kilogram that travels back to the collector. The mills gain a measurable, stable domestic supply and lose nothing but the uncertainty they currently pay through pricing, and the country gains a collection figure that moves the continental statistic off a number that currently reads as zero for most of it. The alternative, a formal collection network built alongside an informal one that undercuts it, has been tried in several markets and has produced idle capacity every time.
For traders, the Nigerian market’s interest is the gap between its documented and undocumented volumes, which is the gap between the material the mills can be certain of and the material they cannot. The Monitor’s global arithmetic, 91 billion US dollars of metal value in 2022’s e-waste with 28 billion captured by documented management, is the same arithmetic in Nigerian terms, and the country’s formal collection figure is what the producers’ registry will eventually publish. Loads from licensed collectors with weight records are what international buyers can price, and the Basel Convention governs the fraction that crosses borders, while scrap.trade handles the documented trade between counterparties. The Global E-waste Monitor 2024 holds the figures above, including the import data that describes the second stream.
The mills depend on the collectors, and the collectors are the part of the system no one has counted, licensed or paid. Nigeria now has the fee, the registry and the network; the remaining invention is a payment that reaches the person who gathers the metal, and that is a clause in a regulation rather than a research question.
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